Mark Zuckerberg CEO Facebook 1601 Willow Rd Menlo Park CA 94025 USA



Thursday, 6th February 2020

Dear Mr Zuckerberg,

RE: Facebook's proposals to extend end-to-end encrypt messaging services

As a coalition of child protection organisations and experts from all parts of the world we are writing to express our significant concerns about your company's proposals to implement end-to-end encryption across your messaging services.

Unfortunately, Facebook has not yet satisfied us that our deeply held concerns will be satisfactorily addressed. We therefore urge you not to proceed with the rollout until and unless you can demonstrate there will be no reduction in children's safety as a result of this decision.

Strong encryption plays a hugely valuable role in keeping citizens and their data safe. We fully recognise that users of online services have a legitimate interest in ensuring their data is protected, and there seems to be a growing appetite for users to have greater control over how their data is used by tech companies. However, as you have stated yourself, Facebook has a responsibility to work with law enforcement and to prevent the use of your sites and services for sexual abuse, including grooming, the sharing of child abuse images, and children being coerced into sending self-generated images and videos.

In your blogpost of 6th March 2019, you recognised that 'there are real safety concerns to address before we can implement end-to-end encryption across all of our messaging services. When billions of people use a service to connect, some of them are going to misuse it for truly terrible things like child exploitation, terrorism, and extortion. But we face an inherent trade-off because we will never find all of the potential harm we do today when our security systems can see the messages themselves.'

We urge you to recognise and accept that an increased risk of child abuse being facilitated on or by Facebook is not a reasonable trade-off to make. Children should not be put in harm's way either as a result of commercial decisions or design choices. Unless demonstrably successful mitigations can be put in place, it seems likely that the consequence will be more serious and sustained sexual abuse on Facebook's virtual properties.

At present, Facebook undertakes market-leading initiatives to identify and remove the most serious illegal content. In 2018, Facebook made 16.8 million reports to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). In the UK alone, this led to 2,500 arrests and 3,000 children being safeguarded. However, NCMEC estimates that as a result of end-to-end encryption, some 70 per cent of Facebook's reports – equivalent to 12 million reports

globally – could be lost. At a time when we could be looking to build upon years of sophisticated initiatives, Facebook instead seems inclined to blindfold itself.

As child protection experts, we cannot overstate the strength of our concerns. Whereas today Facebook's products are primarily used by groomers to make initial contact with children, before migrating them to less scrupulous messaging or livestreaming sites, end-toend encryption will embolden abusers to initiate and rapidly escalate abuse directly on Facebook's services.

If Facebook Messenger and Instagram Direct are both seamlessly integrated into large open platforms, abusers will be able to exploit existing design aspects to make easy and frictionless contact with large numbers of children, and then rapidly progress to sending end-to-end encrypted messages. This presents an unacceptable risk to children, and would arguably make your services unsafe.

Given the scale of these concerns, we call on Facebook to take the following measures:

- invest in safety measures which can demonstrate that the introduction of end-toend encryption results in no net reduction to children's safety, including the ability of Facebook to scan for child abuse images and identify and disrupt abuse taking place on or through its services;
- demonstrate a willingness to embed a voluntary duty of care to protect children in your design decisions on encryption;
- consult widely with child protection experts, governments and law enforcement, so we can be satisfied any proposed mitigations are effective;
- agree to share necessary data with governments and child protection experts to determine the effectiveness of your mitigation strategy, and the impact that encryption has on threat behaviours;
- not proceed with the rollout of end-to-end encryption until you can ensure any proposed mitigations have been fully tested, and will adequately address our concerns.

We would be pleased to work closely with you to ensure that Facebook can deliver the benefits of end-to-end encryption without compromising your ability to disrupt abuse, and that of law enforcement to safeguard children and bring offenders to justice.

We trust you will respond meaningfully to the very serious concerns expressed in this letter, and agree to work productively to ensure children's safety on Facebook is not in any way jeopardised.

Yours sincerely,

The undersigned child protection organisations and experts from around the world:

University of California, Berkeley - Professor Hany Farid Associate Professor of Criminology, University of New South Wales - Dr Michael Salter Children's Charities' Coalition on Internet Safety - John Carr





<u>Albania</u>



CRCA (Children's Human Rights Centre of Albania)

<u>Argentina</u> CASACIDN

<u>Armenia</u> Hope and Help

<u>Australia</u>





the Carly Ryan foundation.

<u>Austria</u> ECPAT Austria

<u>Azerbaijan</u> Azerbaijan Children Union (ACU)

<u>Bangladesh</u> Aparajeyo Bangladesh

<u>Belarus</u> Children Not for Abuse <u>Belgium</u>



ECPAT Belgium

<u>Benin</u> CLOSE

<u>Bhutan</u> RENEW (Respect, Educate, Nurture, Empower Women)

<u>Bolivia</u> Consorcio ECPAT Bolivia

Bosnia and Herzegovina International Forum of Solidarity-EMMAUS

<u>Botswana</u> Stepping Stones International (SSI)

<u>Brazil</u> ECPAT Brazil





Neglected Children's Society

<u>Burkina Faso</u> ABSE

<u>Burundi</u> Fédération Nationale des Associations engagées dans le Domaine de l'Enfance au Burundi/FENADEB

<u>Cambodia</u> Action Pour Les Enfants – APLE Cambodia

<u>Cameroon</u> ASSEJA (Association, Enfants, Jeunes et Avenir)

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Beyond Borders ECPAT Canada

<u>Central African Republic</u> Centre pour la promotion et la Défense des Droits de l'Enfant (CPDE)

<u>Chile</u> ONG Raices

<u>Colombia</u>



ECPAT Colombia/ Fundación Renacer

<u>Costa Rica</u> Fundación PANIAMOR

<u>Cote d'Ivoire</u> SOS Violences Sexuelles

Denmark Save the Children Denmark

Dominican Republic MAIS

<u>Ecuador</u> Fundacion Quitu Raymi <u>Estonia</u>





Estonian Union for Child Welfare Tartu Child Support Center

<u>Finland</u>



Save the Children Finland

France ECPAT France

<u>Gambia</u> Child Protection Alliance Gambia

<u>Georgia</u> The Public Health Foundation of Georgia

<u>Germany</u> ECPAT Germany

<u>Ghana</u> GNCRC

<u>Greece</u>



ARSIS – Association for the Social Support of Youth

<u>Guatemala</u> ECPAT Guatemala

<u>Guinea</u> Le Monde Des Enfants (MDE)

<u>India</u>





EQUATIONS

Indonesia ECPAT Indonesia

Iraq Jiyan Foundation for Human Rights

<u>Italy</u> ECPAT Italy



<u>Japan</u> ECPAT/STOP Japan

<u>Jordan</u> Jordan River Foundation

<u>Kazakhstan</u> National Network of NGOs of the Republic of Kazakhstan

<u>Kenya</u> Kenya Alliance for Advancement of Children (KAACR)

<u>Kyrgyzstan</u> Network of NGOs Fighting against CSEC in Kyrgyzstan <u>Latvia</u>



<u>Lebanon</u> Dar Al-Amal (House of Hope)

<u>Liberia</u> Defence for Children International-Liberia

<u>Lithuania</u>



Paramos vaikams centras Children Support Centre

Luxembourg ECPAT Luxembourg

<u>Macedonia</u>



<u>Malawi</u> Eye of the Child

<u>Malaysia</u> End CSEC Malaysia

<u>Mauritius</u> Halley Movement & Pan-Mauritius Coalition

Mexico ECPAT Mexico

EMBARGOED: 00:01 GMT THURSDAY 6TH FEBRUARY 2020

<u>Moldova</u> Network of National Organisations Fighting against Child Prostitution & Trafficking

Mongolia Affiliate Group for ECPAT International in Mongolia

Morocco AMANE

<u>Mozambique</u> Rede da Criança

<u>Nepal</u> CWIN-NEPAL

Netherlands ECPAT Netherlands

<u>New Zealand</u> ECPAT Child ALERT

<u>Nicaragua</u> ECPAT in Nicaragua (TESIS)

<u>Niger</u> Association Nigérienne pour le Traitement de la Délinquance et la prévention du crime (ANTD)

<u>Nigeria</u> Women's Consortium of Nigeria (WOCON)

<u>Norway</u> ECPAT Norway

<u>Pakistan</u> Pakistan Pediatric Association

<u>Palestine</u> SAWA, All Together

<u>Paraguay</u> Grupo Luna Nueva

<u>Peru</u> Peruvian Network against CSEC

<u>Philippines</u> ECPAT Philippines

EMBARGOED: 00:01 GMT THURSDAY 6TH FEBRUARY 2020

<u>Poland</u> Empowering Children Foundation (formerly Nobody's Children Foundation)



<u>Romania</u> Save the Children Romania (Salvati Copiii)

<u>Russia</u> Russian Alliance against CSEC

<u>Rwanda</u> Coalition Umwana Ku Isonga

<u>Samoa</u> Samoa Victim Support Group

<u>Serbia</u> Network of Organisations for Children of Serbia – MODS

<u>Sierra Leone</u> Defence for Children International-Sierra Leone

<u>South Africa</u> Jelly Beanz Foundation

<u>South Korea</u> Tacteen Naeil

<u>Slovenia</u>



<u>Spain</u>



FAPMI / ECPAT Spain

<u>Sri Lanka</u> ECPAT Sri Lanka / Protecting Environment and Children Everywhere (PEaCE)

Sweden ECPAT Sweden

Switzerland ECPAT Switzerland

<u>Taiwan</u> ECPAT Taiwan

<u>Tanzania</u> KIWOHEDE

<u>Thailand</u> ECPAT Foundation Thailand

<u>Togo</u> WAO-Afrique

<u>Turkey</u> Network against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Turkey

<u>Uganda</u> ECPAT Uganda/UCRNN

<u>USA</u>



United Kingdom







ECPAT UK

<u>Uruguay</u> Asociacion Civil Gurises Unidos

<u>Uzbekistan</u> Tashkent Social Information Center "Istiqbolli Avlod"

<u>Vietnam</u> Vietnam Association for Protection of Child's Rights (VACR)

<u>Zambia</u> CHIN

Zimbabwe Zimbabwe National Council for the Welfare of Children